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Abstract—With the advent of Software Defined Networks
(SDNs), there has been a rapid advancement in the area of
cloud computing. It is now scalable, cheaper, and easier to
manage. However, SDNs are more prone to security vulner-
abilities as compared to legacy systems. Therefore, machine-
learning techniques are now deployed in the SDN infrastructure
for the detection of malicious traffic. In this paper, we provide
a systematic benchmarking analysis of the existing machine-
learning techniques for the detection of malicious traffic in
SDNs. We identify the limitations in these classical machine-
learning based methods, and lay the foundation for a more
robust framework. Our experiments are performed on a publicly
available dataset of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
Index Terms—Software Defined Networking, Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems, Denial of Service (DoS), machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Network (SDN) is extensively used in
different network organizations in the last few years. It can
facilitate the network programmability through decoupling the
control plane from the data plane. This separation simplifies
the ability to deploy new resources quickly with less hassle.
Hence, the programmability feature of SDN inspires many
commercial companies to use SDN in their cloud network. It
allows the organizations to achieve the required behavior by
implementing new applications programming interface (API)
to meet their needs. SDN architecture is comprised by three
distinct layers: data plane, SDN controller, and application
layer.
Despite the great success of SDN in several organizations,
the separation of the control plane from the underlying data
plane increases the chance of exposing the SDN platform to
many threats and risks [1]. Therefore, the SDNs are vulnerable
to different network attacks, including volumetric attacks viz.
SYN floods, service-specific attacks and Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. Such attacks can overwhelm the different three
layers of SDN with security concerns. Many defense methods
are conducted to detect and mitigate the DoS attacks in the
SDN network, such as presented in [2]. These techniques are
based on the collection of the flow features from received
packets like the average number of packet, the frequency
of IP addresses, average number bytes, etc. as significant
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features to detect the DoS inside the SDN network. In the
case of malicious traffic, the size of monitored packets will
be higher than the previous defined threshold or decision
boundary. Although the existing techniques do not require
high processing resources to manage and control the data
flow; it cannot protect the network for a long time. The rapid
growth in the generated data and the huge number of packets
that need to be analyzed and classified in the real-time are
the main drawbacks in the current scenario. Owing to the
similarities between benign traffic and malicious packets, it
becomes a challenging task to detect the malicious traffic.
The attacker can easily modify the packet header to look
like normal traffic and deceive the detection systems without
being discovered. Since anomalies are continuously evolving,
simple modifications can be made that will allow the attacker
to exploit this technique with new kinds of attacks.
Recently, machine learning (ML) and data mining tech-
niques are playing an essential role in the detection and the
classification of intrusion attacks. Several machine learning
studies have been conducted in different domains [3], [4];
however only a few of these are on SDN. There are many
issues that can influence machine learning performance, such
as the feature selection methods, the dataset used etc. However,
there are no related works that perform a systematic analysis of
these machine-learning techniques. The main contributions of
this paper are as follows: (a) we perform a methodical analysis
of the popular approaches for detecting attacks in SDN, and
provide benchmarking analysis of traditional machine-learning
based approaches; and (b) we provide a feature analysis of the
input feature space of the dataset, and provide recommenda-
tions for a reliable intrusion detection system.
II. DETECTING ATTACKS IN SDN
There are two main approaches based on machine learning
that are currently used to detect exploitable attacks on SDN
network: (a) approaches based on simulation, and (b) ap-
proaches based on public datasets. In this section, we provide a
classification and a discussion of the existing methods for both
of these approaches. Table I summarises the related works.
A. ML based simulation
The work presented in [5]–[10] is using network simulation-
based techniques to detect the malicious traffic in SDN net-
work. Fig. 1 discusses the sequential steps in generating a sim-
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ML algorithm Features used Dataset used Dataset size Classes Reference
SVM, Naive Bayes,
KNN
number of Packets, Protocol, Delay, Band-
width, Source IP and Destination IP
Simulation based 6000 data instances,
out of which 2000 are
genuine and 4000 are
malicious packets
Normal and anomaly [5]
SVM srcIP, srcPort, desIP, desPort, proType Simulation based – Normal and anomaly [6]
SVM speed of source IP (SSIP), speed of source
port (SSP), Standard Deviation of Flow
Packets (SDFP), Deviation of Flow Bytes
(SDFB), speed of flow entries (SFE), Ratio
of Pair-Flow (RPF)
Simulation based – Normal and anomaly [7]
ASVM Average number of Flow packets, Average
number of flow bytes, Variation of flow
packets in the sampling interval, Variation
of flow bytes per in the sampling interval,
Average duration of traffics
Simulation based 300 Samples Normal and anomaly [8]
Hidden Markov
Model (HMM)
length of the packet, source port, destination
port, source IP address, and destination IP
address
Simulation based – Normal and anomaly [9]
K-means , SVM packet count, byte count, duration Simulation based 4400 Normal and anomaly
[10]
Random Forest ten feature sets KDD99 494,020 pieces,10%
training set
Normal and anomaly
[11]
C4.5, Bayesian
Network (BayesNet),
Decision Table (DT),
and Naive-Bayes
– LongTail 278,598 Normal and anomaly
[12]
SVM Used 23 features, 29 features and another
experiment apply all 41features
KDD99 – Normal and anomaly
[13]
Naive Bayes, K-
Nearest neighbour,
K-means and K-
medoids
Only one feature Taken from traced
file obtained from
TCP traffic between
Lawrence Berkley
Laboratory and the
rest of the world.
– Normal and abnormal
[14]
SVM 25 from 41 features NSL-KDD 125973 Normal and abnormal
[15]
Hard thresholds With
fuzzy control
Distribution of Inter-Arrival Time, Distri-
bution of packet quantity per flows, Flow
quantity to a server, Number of source IP
addresses to a server, Total traffic volume
counted in bytes to a server.
Log files collected
from NetNam (Viet-
namese ISP)
– Normal and abnormal
[16]
TABLE I: Summary of related works for both ML-based simulation and ML-based public datasets.
ulation dataset. In these approaches, researchers established
network topology with legitimate hosts to generate normal
traffics, and other hosts act as pots to create attack traffics.
They used public tools like Scapy or hping3, to simulate
DoS attacks. The characteristic features, such as speed of
source IP or speed of source port, flow packets etc. are
extracted from the collected traffic for normal and malicious
data separately. Then, all of these samples are random shuffling
in a .CSV file to create the row data which are used in the
training model. The learner model can be used later to classify
the normal and intruded packets inside the SDN platform.
It is clear that these approaches are fast in its computation,
and simple to analyze. However, it has many restrictions that
can be summarized in the following discussion.
Firstly, the created dataset has a very small size and there-
fore, it is not enough to give accurate results (number of
samples are few hundreds or few thousands in most cases).
Additionally, the generated data contains only a few kinds of
attacks. These attacks are not realistic to represent the diversity
of anomalies that are present on the internet. The limitation of
diversity in attack types helps the attacker to know the normal
behavior of the detection mechanism, and it can easily craft
an attack to replicate this behavior.
Secondly, the number of extracted features are insignificant,
and the small number of features are not enough to cover
the behavior of all attacks. Furthermore, the used features for
the learner module were extracted primarily from the packet
header without further inspection of the payload data. The
header field can be easily modified to look like normal ones.
Typically, the attacker can easily implement malicious code
inside the payload packets to cheat the detection systems such
as Root to Local (R2L) attacks, and worm infections. As a
result, they return a poor accuracy for detecting application-
level attacks.
B. ML based public datasets
The work introduced in [11]–[16] is using public dataset
to detect intrusion inside SDN environment. The selection
of the proper dataset has a great impact in the evaluation
of network intrusion detection systems (IDS). Unfortunately,
most of the publicly available datasets are not realistic, and
they lack variety in the type of attack to cover all trends
Fig. 1: The graph shows the sequential steps to create simu-
lation dataset in SDN Network.
found in the internet today. One of the main reasons for these
shortage returns to privacy and legal issues for the service
providers to publish their network data. As a result, most
of available datasets fail to give acceptable accuracy when
deployed with intrusion systems. There are several datasets
such as KDDCUP’99 [17], CICIDS2017 [18], ISCX2012 [19],
Kyoto [20], LBNL [21], UMASS [22], CDX [23], ADFA [24],
DEFCON [25] have been used for intrusion detection systems.
For simplicity, we will evaluate different machine learning
algorithms on NSL-KDD dataset, which is the modified ver-
sion of KDDCUP’99 and produced to overcome the inherent
problems of the KDDCUP’99 data set such as redundancy
problem.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present our experimental results on a
dataset of network attacks. We illustrate the non-linearity of
the input feature space, and also benchmark several machine-
learning based approaches on this dataset.
A. Dataset
The KDDCUP’99 is the original dataset that was mainly
used by researchers for benchmarking purposes [26], [27].
This dataset was generated from the tcpdumps of DARPA
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and was created in Lincoln
Lab. However, there are inherent several drawbacks in this
dataset. Most of the observations in KDDCUP’99 dataset are
highly redundant, and therefore similar observations occur in
both training and testing set. In order to mitigate the drawback
of this dataset, a new variant called NSL-KDD dataset [28]
was released by Tavallaee et al.. This new dataset do not
contain the inherent demerits of KDDCUP’99, and is now
used as the de facto benchmarking dataset by all researchers.
The NSL-KDD dataset contains 24 different type of attacks
in its observation records. The dataset is divided into training
set and testing set. They are referred as KDDTrain+ and
KDDTest+ for training and testing set respectively. A smaller
subset comprising 20% of the entire records are present as
separate files. They are called KDDTrain– and KDDTest– for
training and testing sets respectively. In this paper, we consider
all the attacks in a combined category of malicious traffic. We
formulate our objective in this paper as a binary classification
problem, wherein each observation in the NSL-KDD dataset
is categorized as legitimate or malicious traffic.
B. Non-linearity of the feature space
Prior to the application of any machine-learning techniques,
it is important to analyse the high-dimensional feature space
generated by the dataset. We generate the original feature
space by converting all the features in the dataset into corre-
sponding feature vectors. We normalize all numerical features
of the dataset in the range [0, 1]. The categorical features are
converted to vectors using one-hot encoding.
Fig. 2: We plot the Andrews curve for the NSL-KDD dataset.
We observe that the data streams are highly intertwined with
each other.
We attempt to analyse the non-linearity in this generated
feature space by computing the Andrews curve in the NSL-
KDD dataset. The Andrews plot is essentially a visual repre-
sentation of the original high-dimensional feature space into
two dimensions. It is computed by representing the original
feature space as a finite Fourier series. Fig. 2 describes
the Andrews curve plotted for the NSL-KDD dataset. Each
observations in the dataset is represented by the individual
curve. These individual curves are color coded based on the
type of the traffic – malicious and legitimate. We clearly
observe that the two type of curves are not clearly separated.
The individual streams from the two categories are intertwined
with each other. This indicates that there exists a high-degree
of non-linearity in the feature space.
Furthermore, in order to further investigate the non-linearity
nature of the feature space, we generate the t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) plot. Fig. 3 illustrates
this. The t-SNE plot is a popular technique of dimensionality
reduction technique, that is mostly used for visualizing high-
dimensional feature space. We use this technique as a non-
deterministic measure to cluster the malicious and legitimate
traffic. We observe from Fig. 3 that the observations belonging
to two classes are fairly separated after 1000 epochs. The
data observations have a less overlapping nature for higher
number of epochs, and are clustered in well-defined regions.
This clearly indicates the presence of non-linearity in the
original feature space. We can separate the two classes in
the dataset, only via the use of non-linear dimensionality
reduction techniques viz. t-SNE. t-SNE takes a long time for
its computation to separate the different samples. We use
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the original
feature dimension space from 122 to 20 features, to avoid any
noise and speed up the t-SNE calculations.
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Fig. 3: We show the separation of normal and malicious traffic
using a t-SNE plot. As t-SNE is a non-linear dimensionality
reduction technique, we observe that the separation of the two
classes is better in the two dimensional subspace.
C. Evaluation
In this paper, we deal with a binary classification problem,
wherein we are interested to detect the malicious traffic in the
dataset. Let us suppose that TP , TN , FP and FN denote
the true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative
respectively, while detecting attack samples in the dataset. We
report the following metrics: precision, recall, F-score and
accuracy values for the various benchmarking methods. These
metrics are defined as:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (2)
F-score =
2× Precision× Recall
Precision + Recall
, (3)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
. (4)
We benchmark the popular machine-learning methods and
evaluate their performance in detecting attacks. We benchmark
SVM [29], J48 [30], Naive Bayes [31] and Random Forest [32]
in the NSL-KDD dataset. Table II summarises the results
of the different approaches. We observe that the results on
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ are in general better than that of
KDDTrain– and KDDTest–. This is because models trained
on a smaller dataset fail to converge in the limited number
of samples. Also, we observe that J48 is the best performing
approach, as compared to all benchmarking methods.
D. Discussion
The existing classical ML-based techniques have difficulties
in detecting sophisticated attacks in large-scale network en-
vironments. Several challenges can cause poor classification
results because of irrelevant features, and lack of labeled
training data. These factors lead to the difficulties in detecting
the attacks by using the classical ML methods.
Recently, deep learning (DL) is one of the most significant
solution for solving the weaknesses of machine learning [33].
At present, many companies, such as Google, Microsoft,
Facebook, have broadly used DL in different applications
i.e. speech recognition, image processing. The vital part of
DL techniques extract the intensive features automatically
from unlabeled data records. Therefore, it can be applied in
many cybersecurity tasks such as intrusion detection, traffic
analysis etc. Deep learning can address large-scale network
traffic using multiple processing layers to reconstruct the
unknown structure in the input distribution. It finds a good
representations of the input data, which is generally hard to
obtain using traditional methods. Nowadays, deep learning
algorithms such as recurrent neural network, deep belief net-
work, restricted Boltzmann machine, and deep autoencoders
attract the attention of research community and become a
popular topic of research for dimensionality reduction issues.
DL models have used in the development of IDS as they are
capable of representing highlevel features into more abstract
data features. Different studies attempted to select appropriate
features for intrusion detection, and subsequently develop a
learning model via an algorithm.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have provided a detailed study of various
approaches based on classical ML techniques that are used
in detecting attacks in SDN. We perform our benchmark-
ing experiments on NSL-KDD dataset, and explained why
traditional machine-learning based methods fail to have a
good performance. In the future, we will propose a DL-based
framework that will have superior performance as compared
to the state-of-the-art methods.
REFERENCES
[1] Q. Yan, F. R. Yu, Q. Gong, and J. Li, “Software-defined networking
(SDN) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in cloud com-
puting environments: A survey, some research issues, and challenges,”
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 602–622,
2015.
Dataset Approach Precision Recall F-score Accuracy [in %]
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+
SVM [29] 0.80 0.75 0.75 75.3
J48 [30] 0.85 0.81 0.81 81.5
Naive Bayes [31] 0.80 0.76 0.75 76.1
Random Forest [32] 0.85 0.80 0.80 80.4
KDDTrain– and KDDTest–
SVM [29] 0.75 0.53 0.61 52.7
J48 [30] 0.83 0.64 0.68 63.9
Naive Bayes [31] 0.76 0.56 0.61 55.7
Random Forest [32] 0.84 0.63 0.67 62.9
TABLE II: Evaluation of benchmarking machine-learning methods in NSL-KDD dataset. We evaluate their performance by
computing the precision, recall, F-score and accuracy values.
[2] B. Yuan, D. Zou, S. Yu, H. Jin, W. Qiang, and J. Shen, “Defending
against flow table overloading attack in software-defined networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 231–246,
2016.
[3] S. Dev, B. Wen, Y. H. Lee, and S. Winkler, “Ground-based image
analysis: A tutorial on machine-learning techniques and applications,”
IEEE Geoscience and Remote Sensing Magazine, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 79–
93, 2016.
[4] C. S. Nwosu, S. Dev, P. Bhardwaj, B. Veeravalli, and D. John, “Pre-
dicting stroke from electronic health records,” in Proc. 41st Annual
International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and
Biology Society (EMBC), 2019.
[5] A. Prakash and R. Priyadarshini, “An intelligent software defined
network controller for preventing distributed denial of service attack,”
in Proc. Second International Conference on Inventive Communication
and Computational Technologies (ICICCT). IEEE, 2018, pp. 585–589.
[6] D. Li, C. Yu, Q. Zhou, and J. Yu, “Using SVM to detect DDoS attack
in sdn network,” in IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and
Engineering. IOP Publishing, 2018, vol. 466, p. 012003.
[7] J. Ye, X. Cheng, J. Zhu, L. Feng, and L. Song, “A DDoS attack detection
method based on SVM in software defined network,” Security and
Communication Networks, vol. 2018, 2018.
[8] M. Myint Oo, S. Kamolphiwong, T. Kamolphiwong, and S. Vasupon-
gayya, “Advanced support vector machine-(ASVM-) based detection
for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on software defined
networking (sdn),” Journal of Computer Networks and Communications,
vol. 2019, 2019.
[9] T. Hurley, J. E. Perdomo, and A. Perez-Pons, “HMM-based intrusion
detection system for software defined networking,” in Proc. 15th
IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications
(ICMLA). IEEE, 2016, pp. 617–621.
[10] A. S. da Silva, J. A. Wickboldt, L. Z. Granville, and A. Schaeffer-Filho,
“ATLANTIC: A framework for anomaly traffic detection, classification,
and mitigation in SDN,” in Proc. IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and
Management Symposium. IEEE, 2016, pp. 27–35.
[11] C. Song, Y. Park, K. Golani, Y. Kim, K. Bhatt, and K. Goswami,
“Machine-learning based threat-aware system in software defined net-
works,” in Proc. 26th international conference on computer communi-
cation and networks (ICCCN). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–9.
[12] S. Nanda, F. Zafari, C. DeCusatis, E. Wedaa, and B. Yang, “Predicting
network attack patterns in SDN using machine learning approach,”
in Proc. IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtualization and
Software Defined Networks (NFV-SDN). IEEE, 2016, pp. 167–172.
[13] P. Wang, K-M. Chao, H-C. Lin, W-H. Lin, and C-C. Lo, “An
efficient flow control approach for SDN-based network threat detection
and migration using support vector machine,” in Proc. IEEE 13th
International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE). IEEE,
2016, pp. 56–63.
[14] L. Barki, A. Shidling, N. Meti, DG Narayan, and M. M. Mulla,
“Detection of distributed denial of service attacks in software defined
networks,” in Proc. International Conference on Advances in Com-
puting, Communications and Informatics (ICACCI). IEEE, 2016, pp.
2576–2581.
[15] A. Alshamrani, A. Chowdhary, S. Pisharody, D. Lu, and D. Huang, “A
defense system for defeating DDoS attacks in SDN based networks,”
in Proc. 15th ACM International Symposium on Mobility Management
and Wireless Access. ACM, 2017, pp. 83–92.
[16] J. Smith-perrone and J. Sims, “Securing cloud, SDN and large data
network environments from emerging DDoS attacks,” in Proc. 7th Inter-
national Conference on Cloud Computing, Data Science & Engineering-
Confluence. IEEE, 2017, pp. 466–469.
[17] A. Aggarwal, “The UCI KDD archive,” http://kdd.ics.uci.edu, July 1999.
[18] I. Sharafaldin, A. H. Lashkari, and A. A. Ghorbani, “Toward generating
a new intrusion detection dataset and intrusion traffic characterization.,”
in ICISSP, 2018, pp. 108–116.
[19] Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, “Intrusion detection evaluation
dataset (ISCXIDS2012),” http: //www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids.html.
[20] J. Song, H. Takakura, Y. Okabe, M. Eto, D. Inoue, and K. Nakao,
“Statistical analysis of honeypot data and building of kyoto 2006+
dataset for NIDS evaluation,” in Proc. First Workshop on Building
Analysis Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security. ACM,
2011, pp. 29–36.
[21] B. Nechaev, M. Allman, V. Paxson, and A. Gurtov, “Lawrence berkeley
national laboratory (LBNL)/ICSI enterprise tracing project,” Berkeley,
CA: LBNL/ICSI, 2004.
[22] J. O. Nehinbe, “A critical evaluation of datasets for investigating
IDSs and IPSs researches,” in Proc. 10th International Conference on
Cybernetic Intelligent Systems (CIS). IEEE, 2011, pp. 92–97.
[23] B. Sangster, TJ. O’Connor, T. Cook, R. Fanelli, E. Dean, C. Morrell,
and G. J. Conti, “Toward instrumenting network warfare competitions
to generate labeled datasets.,” in CSET, 2009.
[24] G. Creech and J. Hu, “Generation of a new ids test dataset: Time to
retire the KDD collection,” in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications
and Networking Conference (WCNC). IEEE, 2013, pp. 4487–4492.
[25] The Shmoo Group., “Defcon 8, 10 and 11.,” http://cctf.shmoo.com/,
July.
[26] N. Shone, T. N. Ngoc, V. D. Phai, and Q. Shi, “A deep learning approach
to network intrusion detection,” IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics
in Computational Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41–50, 2018.
[27] A. Dawoud, S. Shahristani, and C. Raun, “Deep learning for network
anomalies detection,” in Proc. International Conference on Machine
Learning and Data Engineering (iCMLDE). IEEE, 2018, pp. 149–153.
[28] M. Tavallaee, E. Bagheri, W. Lu, and A. A. Ghorbani, “A detailed
analysis of the KDD CUP 99 data set,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium
on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications.
IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[29] Y. Tian, Y. Shi, and X. Liu, “Recent advances on support vector
machines research,” Technological and Economic Development of
Economy, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–33, 2012.
[30] G. Kaur and A. Chhabra, “Improved J48 classification algorithm for the
prediction of diabetes,” International Journal of Computer Applications,
vol. 98, no. 22, 2014.
[31] I. Rish et al., “An empirical study of the naive bayes classifier,” in Proc.
IJCAI workshop on empirical methods in artificial intelligence, 2001,
vol. 3, pp. 41–46.
[32] E. Goel, Er. Abhilasha, E. Goel, and E Abhilasha, “Random forest:
A review,” International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer
Science and Software Engineering, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017.
[33] R. Chalapathy and S. Chawla, “Deep learning for anomaly detection:
A survey,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.03407, 2019.
